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Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine" thought experiment is a
central idea in the debate over psychological hedonism. Nozick (1974)
suggests a machine that creates a simulated reality inside a person's mind.
The machine "would give you any experience you desired," while all the
time "you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your
brain" (43). The machine would also make a person forget plugging into
it, so that anyone who plugs in would think the simulated reality was real.
Nozick then asks whether the reader would plug into the machine for life,
knowing that the machine would provide as much pleasure as the reader
could possibly want.
Nozick intended his machine to be a refutation of psychological
hedonism. Since most people would feel some reluctance to plug into the
machine, there must be something more that we desire from life than the
unending pleasure the machine could provide.
What that "something" is has been left up to the readers' imagina-
tions for more than thirty years. For Nozick's purpose, the reasons why we
would not plug into the Experience Machine are not important as long as
they are not dependent on maximizing personal pleasure and minimizing
personal pain.
But the reasons why people will not plug in become more impor-
tant when we are forced to take into consideration that people have, for
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the past seven years, been plugging into the best approximation of
Nozick's Experience Machine we have available. When Everquest, the
first largely successful 3-dimensional massively-multiplayer online role-
playing game (MMORPG), went live in 1999, it began a trend of people
flocking to alternate reality simulations. By 2006, MMORPG's have
become the biggest money-maker in gaming with the most persistent play-
er-base, and with players numbering in the millions in a half-dozen lead-
ing MMO games.
The success of the MMO industry is all well and good. However,
what gives Nozick and contemporary philosophers cause for consideration
is that MMORPG's are closer in essence to the Experience Machine than
they are to traditional games. These games offer persistent, immersive
(though not sensory-immersive) worlds, and people sign onto them specif-
ically for pleasure. And whatever the reasons why they wouldn't spend
their whole lives in the Experience Machine, the players of MMORPG's are
spending significant portions of their lives in game. Millions of people
ages ten and up are sacrificing free time, conventional social interaction,
television, other games, work, school, friends, family, and (in extreme
cases) eating for these games.
Were these games to be sensory immersive – that is, to allow the
players to perceive the fictional reality as if it were real – there is little
doubt that the MMORPG players of today would jump at the chance to
adventure in such a world. With a contemporary example of people's will-
ingness to forgo actual reality for its virtual counterpart, we must read-
dress the Experience Machine and our reasons for refusing to plug in.
What are the differences between MMO games, and the Experience
Machine? Despite their differences, does pleasure remain the purpose of
both? If so, is it possible for a case to be made that an MMO game actual-
ly provides more pleasure for the user?
As we begin to take a look at these issues, it is important first to
note a distinction that has been made in debate over how we might hedo-
nistically consider whether to plug into the Experience Machine. The
arguments offered in this paper will not rely on this distinction, but it
remains important because it is the mind of the person who is considering
whether or not to plug in that we are interested in.
i. The Decision
Recent controversy over the Experience Machine and psychologi-
cal hedonism centers on arguments presented by Elliot Sober and David
Sloan Wilson (1998) in Unto Other: The Evolution and Biology of
Unselfish Behavior. They assert that "quite apart from the amount of
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pleasure and pain that accrues to subject after they decide [whether to
plug in or not], there is a level of pleasure and pain arising from the delib-
eration process itself" (285). Sober (2000) later elaborates on this further
in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, claiming that "Plugging into the
machine resembles suicide in terms of the utter separation it effects with
the real world." However, unlike suicide, "the experience machine deliv-
ers (literally) escapist pleasures" (139).
The argument that the decision to plug into the Experience
Machine must be considered apart from the experience that the user
would have inside the machine has fallen under scrutiny. The purpose of
this paper is neither to attack nor to defend this argument. However, as
we are looking at what people who are considering plugging into the
machine consider important, the notion of game-assisted suicide must
factor in.
ii. Games vs. the Experience Machine
The manifest purpose of both playing games and entering the
Experience Machine is pleasure. However, Nozick and the people who
create MMO games do some very different things when they go about
designing their hedonistic devices. Looking at these differences will per-
haps give us some insight into why we like MMO games, but generally feel
some reservations about Nozick's Experience Machine:
Persistent world beats instanced world every time.
There is an in-joke in the gaming community in which, when
describing someone of surpassing skill (at anything), we will claim that
this person beat Tetris. This is a joke because the game is un-winnable
and will go on forever if a player is skilled enough. However, no matter
what kind of recognition a person could earn for the feat (gamer godhood,
really), it is difficult to imagine anyone playing Tetris for the rest of her
life. There is an important similarity, though, between an unending game
of Tetris and Robert Nozick's Experience Machine.
When a person sits down to play Tetris, the world which she will
occupy for the duration of the game is created for her. Without her, the
world would not exist, and when she stops playing, the world ends. In
gaming, we refer to this as instancing. All single player games are
instanced, as is Nozick's Experience Machine.
There are limitations that we associate with instanced games.
Anything instanced is necessarily static, since by the time that we see a
game, it is complete. We assume that the designers who created it must
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stop work on a product before it can be made available for use. This is not
strictly true, and in the case of Nozick's Experience Machine, a static play
experience would be impossible (as variety is necessary for pleasure).
The underlying assumption that Nozick makes when he proposes
his Experience Machine is that it will be controlled by an Artificial
Intelligence. This is the only way to accomplish a dynamic instanced play
experience without devoting a team of people to creating content, full-time
for each person using the machine. An AI may seem like an easy thing to
assume in this case, but we must consider that Nozick is now not only
positing a machine that provides pleasure, but also a completely alien
intelligence that we know next to nothing about. Further, we now have to
consider every bias we have developed for and against thinking machines,
and everything that we know, think we know, and know we don't know
about AI. That's a lot of extra baggage to throw into something that used
to be as simple as a pleasure machine. And we haven't even considered
our feelings about a machine simulating people.
All of these issues are resolved in MMO games with persistent
worlds. A persistent world allows multiple users to interact with each
other in an environment that exists independently of any individual. By
allowing other users into one simulated environment, we create a scenario
where a comparatively small team of developers can create dynamic con-
tent for the game. Further, the other players themselves provide dynamic
interactions that make the play experience more pleasurable.
Using only the technology of today, and only entities we are capa-
ble of understanding, we can create a simulated environment that exists
for the purpose of pleasure and that people will willingly take part in.
There are other problems that we are faced with when considering
whether to plug into Nozick's Experience Machine. We'll now look at the
problem of legacy, and see how games with persistent worlds help resolve
this as well.
We really like people – maybe even need them –
and definitely want them to know what we're doing.
Among the reasons that people most often give when they justify
refusing Nozick's Experience Machine is that they want what they do with
their lives to have some impact, or tangible effect on the world. What
cause does the rest of the world have to look at the actions of a person
plugged into Nozick's Experience Machine? Apart from entertainment
("MTV's The Fake World"), there aren't very many reasons to do so. The
purpose of Nozick's Experience Machine is to provide a person who enters
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it with the maximum pleasure and the minimum pain. While it may seem
as if we could minimize pain by simulating human interaction, it is that
interaction that is our greatest source of pleasure. As social creatures, the
greatest pleasure that could possibly be provided to us would be in allow-
ing the people who are using the machine to interact with each other. We
could then maintain the purposes that we derive for ourselves and achieve
some personal recognition in doing so. We can maintain a potential for
legacy. If we do this, we will start to see a significant number of people
who willingly enter the machine.
Recognition isn't the only type of legacy that we find pleasurable.
By entering into the machine, a person would be sacrificing any reproduc-
tive potential. From the perspective of someone outside the machine, two
offspring who will continue to exist after that person dies offers signifi-
cantly more pleasure than two kids who the ExperienceMachine will even-
tually just turn off.
The problem of reproductive legacy is somewhat more complicat-
ed to solve, because it requires us to address deception.
What's it like to have a memory forcibly removed?
Nozick's Experience Machine doesn't strike us as a particularly
friendly device. Upon plugging in, we are forced to forget anything we
know about the real world and are deceived into believing the computer-
generated world is real. The machine severs our link with anything that
we have been or done in the real world in the interest of providing us
pleasure in the fake one.
On the matter of memory alteration, Nozick is being a little unfair.
None of us have ever had a memory removed (or at least don't remember
it if we have). Further, the prospect of being forcibly parted with our
memories seems more than a bit unpleasant, since we base so much of
who we are off of our experience. Because of this, when Nozick asks if we
would forgo the real world for a more pleasurable fake one, what we
instead hear is "Would you forgo being a person for a happiness that it is
impossible for you to comprehend?" We say no, and we say no hedonisti-
cally.
However, were the machine not to deceive, it would seem that the
amount of pleasure it could provide us would be limited. People who plug
into the machine would take with them whatever burdens they bring from
the real world. Further, the content of the simulated world would always
be under scrutiny, since it can be compared to its real life counterpart.
What we often overlook is that the primary reason for entering the
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Experience Machine is to be able to have the experiences we couldn't have
in real life. If the machine forces us to think that the computer-generated
world is real, then our fear of consequences will continue to limit the expe-
riences we will have in the machine.
Further, the machine deceives because it seems that people using
the machine would gain greater pleasure if they thought their accomplish-
ments, recognition and legacy were real. The counter to this is obvious to
any gamer. Accomplishment in game is real accomplishment. When a
basketball team wins a game, its members have done something they can
be proud of. The fact that the environment in which they had their success
was artificially constructed makes little difference. And, like with a well-
known basketball team, there is similar opportunity for recognition
amongst those interested. MMORPG players generally know who the best
players on their server are, or at least the name of an elite organization.
Without deception, the potential for accomplishment is preserved.
Further, without deception, users who would plug into the
Experience Machine would retain the pleasure granted them by knowing
that they could leave the machine. Users can maintain reproductive
potential, and be free to enter the machine without regard for preservation
of their personal genes or of the species at large. Moreover, having the
memory of an often unpleasant, unforgiving world outside the machine
would allow users to know just how pleasurable an experience they are
having inside (is pleasure really pleasure if you don't know how pleasura-
ble it is?). The knowledge that players are free to leave the real world for
the machine and vice versa would likely go a long way toward alleviating
the feeling of being trapped or limited that we often encounter in everyday
life. And people who know that they can leave the machine are that much
more likely to remain inside it willingly. MMO players don't have to spend
every second of their available time in game. They know that they do not.
They do it anyway, because they want to.
iii. Fun, Games and Conclusions
MMORPG's and their future incarnations (visual internet commu-
nity, virtual reality, sensory immersion) address the problems that we
have with Nozick's Experience Machine. They take into account that peo-
ple really do derive pleasure from interacting with other people. They do
not deceive users (apart from the willing suspension of disbelief that any
fiction requires). They allow users freedom to act in ways that survival
instinct, the physical world and society prohibit. They exist for the pur-
pose of pleasure and they are seeing plenty of use.
When we closely examine Nozick's Experience Machine with
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regard for what these video games are doing differently, we begin to notice
some assumptions Nozick makes that limit the amount of pleasure we
could get from the machine. A static play experience for Experience
Machine users would produce only limited pleasure. A dynamic experi-
ence controlled by an AI brings into play all the philosophical baggage that
any discussion of AI requires. We derive pleasure from interaction with
other people, yet the Experience Machine forbids this. We do not like
being deceived, and we have no idea what it's like to have a memory taken
from us, but it certainly doesn't seem pleasant.
Robert Nozick asked us to conceive of a device that would cause us
the maximum pleasure and the minimum pain. But the device he outlined
as his Experience Machine is not that device. Nozick instead created a
device that was, by its very nature, unpleasant and difficult to understand.
Yet, we understand games, we like them just fine. In a time when more
people than ever are turning to games as a source of pleasure and those
people are devoting more of their lives to the games, we must reconsider
what we thought we learned from the Experience Machine. Psychological
hedonism may not be a complete account for human motivation but, for
gamers at least, it is a notion that cannot be so easily pushed aside.
Works Cited
Everquest (1999-2005). Sony Computer Entertainment America Inc.
Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic
Books Inc.
Pazhitnov, Alexey (1985). Tetris. USSR: Elektronorgtechnica.
Sober, Elliot andWilson, David Sloan (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution
and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge: Harvard Univ.
Press.
Sober, Elliot (2000). "Psychological Egoism" in The Blackwell Guide to
Ethical Theory. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
76 JOSH TAYLOR
